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INTRODUCTION
The global legal order as we know it today developed largely to ac-
commodate and facilitate the modern state system that arose in the wake
of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. As a result, international law consists
primarily of international agreements1 and customary rules arising out of
state practice and recognition.2 States still remain the primary subjects of
international law today, but they are increasingly joined by other actors on
* J.D., May 2013, University of Michigan Law School; M.A., International Relations,
Yale University; B.A., International Studies and German Studies, Vassar College.  I would
like to thank the editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law for their hard work
and dedication.
1. This Note uses the terms international agreement, international treaty, interna-
tional covenant and international instrument interchangeably to refer to a treaty, as defined
by article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art.2, May 23, 1969, [hereinafter Vienna Convention], 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(1969).
2. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5–6 (6th ed. 2008). For a history of
the development of the modern global legal order, see id. at 1–11. See also MORTON A.
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the global stage, including international organizations and individuals–and
the global legal order has struggled to adapt and adjust.
One such actor is the European Union (EU)—a quasi-supranational
regional organization that asserts supremacy over the municipal law of its
Member States within ever expanding internal legal spheres of compe-
tence. How does this new actor, which the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has declared to be “a new legal order of international law,”3 fit into
the global legal order? How do the rules of the international system apply
to the EU and how does the EU view itself within this frame? In the words
of Advocate General Maduro of the ECJ, the risk arose that the EU’s
legal order and the international legal order might just “pass by each other
like ships in the night.”4
This Note examines the challenge posed by supranational regional or-
ganizations such as the EU to one particular field of international law: the
international human rights regime. The international human rights regime
includes a number of different sources of international human rights law,
including international covenants, customary international law and general
principles,5 and this Note will focus in particular on the application of the
international human rights treaties within the European context. The EU
raises a particular set of problems with respect to the legal effect of the
international human rights covenants and the obligations of the Member
States that are parties to those agreements. With a few exceptions, the EU
itself is not a party to the vast majority of international human rights trea-
ties.6 Yet nearly all of its Member States have ratified and are bound by
the panoply of international human rights instruments, including the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimi-
KAPLAN & NICHOLAS B. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1961).
3. Case 26/2, van Gen en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie de Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1 ¶ 3.
4. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah
Kadi v. Council of the Eur. Union & Comm’n of the European Communities, ¶ 22 (delivered
on Jan. 16, 2008).
5. See generally Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1988–89).
6. The EU ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2010.
Press Release, European Commission, EU ratifies UN Convention on Disability Rights, No.
IP/11/4 (Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-4_en.htm.  The
EU is also in negotiations with the Council of Europe for accession to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. For an overview of accession negotiations and history, see generally
European Convention on Human Rights: Accession of the European Union, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention (last
visited May 16, 2014).
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nation Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention Against Torture
(CAT).7
The ECJ has asserted that EU law has supremacy over the municipal
law of its Member States within the EU legal spheres of competence, in-
cluding with regard to the enumeration, definition and enforcement of
human rights. The ever-expanding transfer of authority by the Member
States to the EU, however, raises numerous questions with regard to the
application of the international human rights regime. Do the obligations of
the Member States under international human rights treaties extend to
these transferred spheres of competence? Does the EU somehow succeed
to these obligations? Who can be held responsible for a violation of inter-
national human rights law in the EU spheres of competence? Are the EU
spheres of competence arising unchecked and outside the international
human rights regime?
This Note examines the challenges posed by the EU to the interna-
tional human rights regime. Specifically, this Note will focus on how the
ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Member
States have addressed the question of the relationship of the EU to inter-
national human rights law. Together, these three institutions have woven a
complex legal paradigm that, this Note argues, situates the EU in a lacuna
within the international human rights regime. Part I begins by examining
how the ECJ has defined the relationship of EU law to international law,
including its position in relation to international human rights law. Part II
examines the question from the perspective of public international law and
the law of treaties. Next, Part III will review how two key potential exter-
nal judicial checks, the ECtHR and the Member States themselves, have
addressed the relationship of the EU to international human rights law.
These two actors, Part III argues, have established relationships of ex-
treme deference to the EU with regard to human rights, which in practice
make the ECJ the final judicial authority on human rights within the
spheres of EU competence. Finally, Part IV turns to examine whether de-
spite the lacuna, the EU is ensuring compliance of its own accord. While
the EU cannot be said at present to be in gross contravention of interna-
tional human rights, the current legal framework in place indicates a num-
ber of systemic weaknesses, a failure to adequately integrate the
international human rights instruments and no internal (or external)
mechanisms to otherwise ensure compliance.
The EU has emerged largely unchecked by external judicial control
mechanisms with regards to human rights, and it has become the final au-
thority on the delineation and definition of human rights within the EU
human rights regime. The Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has expressed the concern that the
EU and its current legal framework strike at the heart of the principle of
7. For an updated list of ratifications, reservations and declarations to the main inter-
national human rights treaties, please see Chapter IV: Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en
(last visited May 16, 2014).
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universality on which human rights rests, both legally and conceptually.8
The EU’s relationship to international human rights law as it currently
stands has created significant gaps in human rights protection in Europe
and poses a threat to the integrity of the international human rights regime
as a whole.
I. THE EU’S PERSPECTIVE: HOW THE EU DEFINES ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The EU defines its legal character as a political entity in large part
through the case law of the ECJ, the highest court in the EU in matters of
EU law. This self-definition includes both an internal and an external di-
mension, which together—according to the ECJ—constitute a special, new
kind of legal order on the global stage. Through the principle of
supremacy, the ECJ has asserted and created a relationship internally be-
tween EU law and the municipal law of the Member States. Through the
principle of autonomy, the ECJ has also positioned the EU externally in
relation to international law. By defining itself as this special, new kind of
legal order, the EU has asserted itself as the supreme and final authority
on the delineation and definition of human rights within the EU human
rights regime.
A. The Relationship of EU Law to International Law
In the landmark 1963 case of Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland
Revenue Administration, the ECJ characterized the legal sphere the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) had cre-
ated as “a new legal order of international law.”9 A year later, in Costa v.
ENEL, the ECJ established the principle of the supremacy of EU law over
the law of its Member States, finding that “the law stemming from the
[EEC] Treaty . . . could not, because of its special and original nature, be
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framedFalse” and that
“[t]he transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Com-
munity legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty
carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights.”10 The
court reasoned that “[b]y creating a Community of unlimited duration . . .
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within lim-
ited fields, and . . . thus created a body of law which binds both their
nationals and themselves.”11
The extent to which the Member States have limited their sovereignty
under the EEC Treaty and subsequent agreements, i.e. the extent of the
8. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE EURO-
PEAN UNION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, at 8 (2011), available at http://www
.europe.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/EU_and_International_Law.pdf [hereinafter
OHCHR STUDY].
9. van Gend, 1963 E.C.R. ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
10. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594.
11. Id. at 593.
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EU’s supranational governance, varies across policy fields.12 In some, the
EU holds exclusive competence, and the EU alone is able to legislate and
adopt binding acts, with the Member States’ role limited to applying
them.13 In other sectors, the national governments remain the primary
policy-makers, while in yet others, competence is shared, and the Member
States may exercise their competence only in so far as the EU has not
exercised, or has decided not to exercise, its own competence.14
According to the court in Costa v. ENEL, the EEC Treaty, had “cre-
ated its own legal system which . . . became an integral part of the legal
systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to ap-
ply.”15 Internally, according to the court, the legal order created by the
EEC Treaty is different from those created by “ordinary international
treaties”16 and could not be treated as such by its Member States. It still
remained for the ECJ to define how this “new legal order” would relate to
the rest of international law on the global stage.
The relationship of the EU to international law has developed slowly
in the case law of the ECJ, as the court faced new challenges when con-
fronting different fields of international law.17 Particularly in the early
formative years of the European project, the success of the ECJ’s first
internal assertions of authority and supremacy depended largely on their
acceptance by the Member States. Determining whether and how the EU
might be bound by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
necessarily involved different underlying political and economic interests
rather than the question of whether the EU is bound by a United Nations
Security Council resolution or international human rights law. A Member
12. See Division of competences within the European Union, EUROPA SUMMARIES OF
EU LEGISLATION, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lis-
bon_treaty/ai0020_en.htm (last visited May 16, 2014) [hereinafter Division of Competences]
(explaining that the EU has different level of competences depending on how much power
the Member States delegate to it in that policy field); see also Alec Stone Sweet & Wayne
Sandholtz, European Integration and Supranational Governance, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 297,
298–99 (1997).
13. The areas where the EU has exclusive competence include the customs union, the
establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market,
monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro, and the common com-
mercial policy. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 3, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. See also Division of
Competences, supra note 12.
14. The areas where the EU has shared competence include some aspects of social
policy, environment, consumer protection, energy, the area of freedom, security and justice,
and certain aspects of common safety concerns in public health matters. TFEU art. 4. See
Division of Competences, supra note 12. Under article 6, the EU has competence to carry
out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States in such
areas of action as the protection and improvement of human health, culture, tourism, educa-
tion, civil protection and administrative cooperation. TFEU art. 6.
15. Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 593
16. Id.
17. See generally, Robert Schu¨tze, EC Law and International Agreements of the Mem-
ber States – An Ambivalent Relationship?, 9 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 387 (2007).
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State may be more inclined to disregard the ECJ’s assertion that EU law is
not bound by the GATT, which involves very concrete and direct eco-
nomic and political consequences for the Member States, than such an
assertion about other types of international law. Defining the relationship
of the EU to international law thus had implications on the viability of the
broader European project. As a result, during the early period of the
Community legal order, the relationship of the EU to international law
was, as described by Robert Schu¨tze, an “uneasy” one, characterized by
“ambivalence” on the part of the court.18
In the famous 1972 International Fruit case,19 the ECJ examined the
relationship of EU law to the GATT. The Court addressed the question,
inter alia, of whether regulations adopted by the European Commission
could be held invalid as being contrary to the GATT.20 The Court re-
sponded by creating a succession doctrine in relation to GATT, concluding
that “in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed the
powers previously exercised by Member States in the area covered by the
General Agreement, the provisions of that agreement have taken effect of
binding the Community.”21 The Court reasoned that by conferring on the
European Community certain powers and functions that fell under the
GATT, “the Member States showed their wish to bind [the Community]
by the obligations entered into under the general agreement.”22 The Com-
munity would thus succeed to the obligations of its Member States under
the GATT, even though it was not itself a party to the agreement.
In spite of the succession doctrine created in International Fruit, the
Community became an official member of the WTO on January 1, 1995,23
thereby formally binding itself to the GATT and rendering the doctrine
unnecessary with regard to the relationship of EU law to the GATT. Rob-
ert Schu¨tze explains how the succession doctrine largely became a dead
letter after that, and lay dormant for several decades without being ex-
tended to any other fields of international law.24 During this period, the
ECJ issued a series of judgments that took a particularly conservative ap-
proach to the relationship of European law to international law, stressing
the autonomous character of the European legal order.25
18. See id. at 387.
19. Joined Cases, 21-24/72, Int’l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit,
1972 E.C.R. 1219, ¶ 4.
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 18.
22. Id. ¶ 15.
23. Member Information: The European Union and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (last visited
May 16, 2014).
24. Robert Schu¨tze, On ‘Middle Ground’: The European Community and Public Inter-
national Law 13 (EUI Working Papers Law 2007/13, 2007), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/
handle/1814/6817.
25. See, e.g., Case C-377/02, Van Parys v. Belgisch Interventie, 2005 E.C.R. I-1465;
Case C-308/06, Intertanko v. Sec’y of State for Transp., 2008 E.C.R. I-04057; Case C-188/07,
Commune de Mesquer v. Total France SA & Total Int’l Ltd., 2008 E.C.R. I-4501.
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For example, in Commission v. Ireland (MOX Plant),26 the European
Commission raised a complaint against Ireland for having taken the
United Kingdom to international arbitration under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning the mixed ox-
ide plant located in Sellafield, United Kingdom. UNCLOS provides in ar-
ticle 287 that state parties to the convention may choose among a series of
means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or ap-
plication of the Convention, including arbitration.27 The ECJ found that a
significant part of the dispute between Ireland and the UK came within
the scope of EC competence,28 and held that the ECJ holds exclusive juris-
diction on the matter.29 The Court based its holding in part on the reason-
ing that an international agreement “cannot affect . . . the autonomy of the
Community legal system.”30 According to this more conservative ap-
proach, the autonomy of the European legal order meant that when the
Member States transferred certain competences to the EU, these areas of
competence became exclusively bound by European law, and the Member
States were no longer free to apply other international rules to them as
dictated by other international bodies.
The succession doctrine resurged again briefly in 2005 when the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of the ECJ addressed the question of the relation-
ship of EU law to the Charter of the United Nations in Yusuf v. Council
and Commission31 and Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commis-
sion.32 In both cases, the CFI found that even though “the Community as
such is not directly bound by the Charter of the United Nations,”33 it is
nevertheless “bound by the obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations in the same way as its Member States, by virtue of the Treaty
establishing it.”34 Citing to International Fruit, the court reasoned that by
transferring certain powers to the European spheres of competence, “the
Member States demonstrated their will to bind it by the obligations en-
tered into by them under the Charter of the United Nations.”35 According
to the CFI, the Community thus succeeded to the obligations of its Mem-
ber States under the United Nations Charter with regard to the powers
26. Case C-459/03, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. I-04635, ¶¶ 1, 30.
27. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
28. Comm’n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. ¶ 120.
29. Id. ¶ 136.
30. Id. ¶123.
31. Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council &
Comm’n, 2005 ECR II-3533, ¶¶ 232–59.
32. Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649,
¶¶ 183–208.  For a discussion and analysis of the revival of the succession doctrine in the
Yusuf Court of First Instance judgment, see Schu¨tze, supra note 17, at 402–06.
33. Yusuf, 2005 E.C.R. ¶ 242; Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. ¶ 192.
34. Yusuf, 2005 E.C.R. ¶ 243; Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. ¶ 193.
35. Kadi, 2005 E.C.R. ¶ 200.
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and functions that had been transferred by the States to its spheres of
competence.
But this revival proved short-lived. Both cases were appealed to the
ECJ, and in 2008, the ECJ issued the final judgment in Kadi, which is also
its current position on the relationship of EU law to international law. The
decision contrasts sharply with the positions taken in both CFI decisions,36
as well as Advocate General Maduro’s opinion.37 The Council Regulation
at issue in Kadi gave effect to United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions and imposed restrictive measures against persons and entities associ-
ated with various terrorists.38 In its final judgment, the ECJ annulled the
Council Regulation at issue on the ground that it violated fundamental
rights of the EU.39
In determining the relationship of EU law to United Nations Security
Council Resolutions, the ECJ framed its analysis as a matter of Commu-
nity law and located the debate within the frame of the European legal
order:
The question of the Court’s jurisdiction arises in the context of the
internal and autonomous legal order of the Community, within
whose ambit the contested regulation falls and in which the Court
has jurisdiction to review the validity of Community measures in
the light of fundamental rights.40
The court determined that the United Nations Security Council Regu-
lations do not have “generalised immunity from jurisdiction within the in-
ternal legal order of the Community.”41 Rather, the ECJ asserted:
[T]he review by the Court of the validity of any Community mea-
sure in the light of fundamental rights must be considered to be
the expression, in a community based on the rule of law, of a con-
stitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autono-
mous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an
international agreement.42
The court then proceeded to examine the validity of the Council Reg-
ulation and found it constituted an unjustified violation of Mr. Kadi’s right
to property and must be annulled.43 In so doing, the ECJ affirmed the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court and autonomy of the Community legal
36. See supra notes 31–35.
37. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 37–40.
38. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l
Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351 ¶1
39. Id.  ¶¶ 354–76.
40. Id.  ¶¶ 316–17.
41. Id.  ¶ 321.
42. Id.  ¶ 316.
43. Id.  ¶¶ 354–76 (annulling the contested regulation, but maintaining its effects for a
period of three months in order to allow the Council to remedy the infringements found).
Fall 2014] Human Rights Challenges and the European Union 187
order from international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations.44
At present the default state of the relationship between EU law and
international law is the restrictive approach articulated in Kadi, which
largely leaves the autonomy of the European legal order intact. In many
respects, Kadi confirms Martti Koskenniemi’s concern about the
“marginalization of international law by the ECJ.”45 In the wake of the
MOX Plant decision, Koskenniemi wrote: “the Court is saying [the Euro-
pean project] enjoys precedence over the international project, European
institutions–and their institutional bias–ought to overrule institutions
claiming to represent the universal.”46 While it briefly entertained the idea
of “functional succession” by the EU to international agreements entered
into by the Member States,47 the ECJ in Kadi certainly seems to have set
it aside for good.
B. The European Human Rights Regime
According to the treaties and ECJ case law, the EU requires respect
for human rights48 in those legal spheres where it has acquired compe-
tence. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR)
enshrines certain rights of EU citizens and residents, such as the freedom
of assembly and association (Article 12), or the right to the protection of
personal data (Article 8).49 Article 51 CFR limits the scope of application
of the Charter, specifying that its provisions apply to EU institutions and
to the Member States “only when they are implementing Union law.”50
The CFR was given full legal effect by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which
amended Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) to give the
CFR the same legal value as the Treaties,51 and reaffirmed its limited
44. See Id.  103, 285, 317.
45. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law: Between Fragmentation and Constitution-
alism, ¶ 5 (Nov. 27, 2006), available at http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/
MCanberra-06c.pdf.
46. Id.
47. Int’l Fruit Co., 1972 E.C.R. ¶ 7.
48. I use the term “human rights” here as a proxy for the terminology of “general
principles” or “fundamental rights” used in EU treaties or ECJ case law.
49. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 8, 12, 2010 O.J. (C 83)
2 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
50. Id. art. 51(1) (“The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and
to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.  They shall therefore
respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance
with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as con-
ferred on it in the Treaties.”).
51. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 1
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon] (“[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as
adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the
Treaties.”).
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scope of application.52 The institutions of the EU and the Member States
(when implementing and interpreting EU law) are thus obligated to re-
spect the rights enumerated in the CFR, and the ECJ monitors the compli-
ance of these acts.53
In requiring that EU action respect human rights, it is important to
highlight that the EU’s role in relation to human rights is also restricted to
just that: ensuring respect. The OHCHR has expressed concern about the
lack of recognition of positive duties in relation to human rights by the
EU.54 By requiring respect, the approach of the European Union is purely
negative: EU law may not violate human rights standards, but the institu-
tions have no duty to undertake activities that promote and protect human
rights.55 Thus the EU, as an institution implementing and enforcing
human rights, is strongly limited by the scope of application of its human
rights competences.
The scope of the ECJ’s authority to ensure respect for and compliance
with human rights in the EU spheres of competence is further limited by
the fact that not all types of EU law may be reviewed by the ECJ. As
provided in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU), the ECJ has jurisdiction, inter alia, to interpret the Treaties and
to determine the validity of and interpret the acts of the institutions, bod-
ies, offices or agencies of the Union.56 The ECJ may thus review the valid-
ity of EU secondary law as to its compliance with EU human rights
standards. However, the EU judicial mechanisms do not have the power
to invalidate provisions of EU primary law—which consists primarily of
the establishing treaties of the EU—leaving these unreviewable with re-
gard to human rights standards.57
Regarding the content of the rights the EU respects, the EU instru-
ments and ECJ case law have framed these rights as community law in-
formed by other sources. When expounding on these other sources,
however, the treaties and case law make no explicit reference to interna-
52. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Communities, Annex A, art. 1, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [here-
inafter Treaty of Lisbon].
53. See TEU post-Lisbon art. 6 (giving the CFR the same legal value as the Treaties)
and art. 19 (defining the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union to “ensure that in
the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed”); Tawhida Ahmed &
Israel de Jesus Butler, The European Union and Human Rights: An International Law Per-
spective, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 771, 773 (2006).
54. See OHCHR STUDY, supra note 8, at 14.
55. See TEU post-Lisbon art. 19 (defining the role of the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union); Israel de Jesus Butler & Olivier De Schutter, Binding the EU to International
Human Rights Law, 27 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 277, 278 (2008).
56. TFEU post-Lisbon arts. 263–64 (actions for annulment), art. 267 (preliminary
rulings).
57. Id. art. 267. See also Paul De Hert & Fisnik Korenica, The Doctrine of Equivalent
Protection: Its Life and Legitimacy Before and After the European Union’s Accession to the
European Convention of Human Rights, 13 GER. LAW J. 874, 882–83 (2012).
Fall 2014] Human Rights Challenges and the European Union 189
tional human rights treaties except for the ECHR.58 Thus, Article 6(3) of
the TEU states that the general principles of Union law shall be consti-
tuted by “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.”59
Similarly, the CFR Preamble states only that the rights in the Charter re-
sult from “the constitutional traditions and international obligations com-
mon to the Member States . . . the [ECHR], the Social Charters adopted
by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the
[ECJ] and of the [ECHR].”60 On the scope of guaranteed rights, Article
52 of the CFR provides that insofar as rights contained in the Charter
correspond to rights contained in the ECHR, their meaning and scope
shall be the same as those in the ECHR.61
The EU has recognized that it is bound by international human rights
obligations insofar as they are contained in customary international law62
and any international human rights treaties to which the EU is a party.
While some key human rights standards have been recognized to be part
of customary international law, such as the prohibition on genocide63 and
freedom from systemic racial discrimination,64 most have not yet achieved
this status. With a few exceptions, the EU is also not a party to the vast
panoply of human rights treaties to which its Member States are party.
The EU ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
in 2010,65 and is currently in negotiations with the Council of Europe for
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.66 However, as
will be discussed in further detail below, these treaties remain limited in
58. In rare cases, the explanatory documents of key legislation makes reference to
international human rights treaties, but not as binding authority on the implementation or
interpretation of EU law.  For example, the explanatory document to the CFR states that
Article 24 on the rights of the child “is based on the New York Convention on the Rights of
the Child.” EXPLANATIONS RELATING TO THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, at 25, CHARTE 4473/00 (Oct. 11, 2000), available at http://www.europarl
.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf.
59. See TEU post-Lisbon art. 6(3).
60. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 49, pmbl.
61. Id. art. 52(3). Article 52 further states that “insofar as this Charter recognizes fun-
damental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.” Id. art.52(4).
62. See, e.g., Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH&Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998
E.C.R. I-3688, ¶¶ 24, 45–46; Case C-386/08, Brita GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen,
2010 E.C.R. I-01289, ¶¶ 40–42; Case C-308/06, Intertanko and others v. Sec’y of State for
Transp., 2008 E.C.R. I-4057, ¶ 51. See also OHCHR STUDY, supra note 8, at 6.
63. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 23 (May 28).
64. Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 34
(Feb. 5); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advi-
sory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 131 (June 21).
65. See Press Release supra note 6.
66. See id.
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scope and are far from covering all the rights that are protected by the
international human rights regime.67
The EU has defined itself as the supreme and final definer and en-
forcer of human rights within its spheres of competence. As asserted in
Van Gend & Loos and affirmed in Kadi, the EU also considers itself to
have a special status on the global stage, viewing itself as a new legal order
of international law characterized by autonomy from other bodies of inter-
national law. It does not consider itself to be bound by international
human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR or ICESCR, which it has not
ratified.
II. THE PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE LAW OF TREATIES
Public international law and the law of treaties as codified in the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law Treaties (VCLT) developed in large part to
accommodate and facilitate a global system that was and remains prima-
rily an international system—in other words, a system whose primary ac-
tors are states.68 With the EU asserting its character as a new kind of legal
order different from that of ordinary international treaties and demanding
a kind of special or exceptional treatment on the global stage,69 it was
unclear how the EU would and should fit within the rules and framework
of the traditional international system. As Advocate General Maduro so
colorfully described the issue in his opinion on the Kadi case, the risk
arose that the EU’s legal order and the international legal order might
“pass by each other like ships in the night,”70 with neither truly taking into
account or accommodating the other. Public international law and in par-
ticular the law of treaties—part of which reflects customary international
law71 and therefore is binding on the EU—provides key guidance on the
challenge posed by the EU to the international human rights regime.
It is useful to begin by explaining some of the particularities of inter-
national human rights treaties as a subfield of international law. Human
rights treaties differ from ordinary treaties in a number of key respects.
First, human rights law is “inward-targeted,” constraining and limiting the
behavior and acts of States within their own territory as opposed to exter-
67. See infra notes 102, 171–175.
68. See Shaw, supra note 2, at 1–11.
69. See Magdalena Likova´, European Exceptionalism in International Law, 19 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 463, 463 (2008).
70. See Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-402/05 P, Yassin
Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the Eur. Union and the Comm’n of the Eur. Communities, ¶ 22
(2008).
71. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 47 (June 21); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Repub.
of Ger. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 49, ¶ 36 (Feb. 2).
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nally in their relations with other States.72 Human rights treaties also em-
body substantive norms of a universalist character, rather than codify an
exchange of rights and benefits as between State parties to the agreement,
as would be the case in a bilateral trade agreement. As Rosalind Higgins
explains:
Human rights treaties are not just an exchange of obligations be-
tween states where they can agree at will, in a web of bilateral
relationships within a multilateral treaty, what bargains they find
acceptable. Human rights treaties . . . reflect rights inherent in
human beings, not dependent upon grant by the State.73
As a result, human rights treaties focus on the protection of the basic
rights of individuals, not the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual
benefit of the contracting states. As such, international human rights trea-
ties may be described as having a kind of third party—the individuals
themselves.
Because human rights treaties lack much of the reciprocal nature of
obligations inherent in other types of agreements, they also lack the un-
derlying incentive structure, which inheres in the reciprocity that under-
girds traditional treaties.74 As a result, the majority of international
human rights treaties lack strong enforcement mechanisms, and the imple-
mentation and enforcement of international human rights treaties depends
significantly on the initiative and goodwill of the contracting parties.75 The
ECHR is an exception to this trend with its own tribunal—the European
72. Bruno Simma & Gleider I. Herna´ndez, Legal Consequences of an Impermissible
Reservation to a Human Rights Treaty: Where Do We Stand?, in THE LAW OF TREATIES
BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION, 60, 61 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011).
73. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, The United Nations: Still a Force for Peace, 52 MOD. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1989).
74. Under an ordinary treaty such as a trade agreement, an impermissible reservation
by one party will have a direct negative impact on the other parties’ ability to gain the in-
tended benefits from the treaty.  Thus, a party has an incentive to object to the reservation
and even preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the two parties in order to
protect its interests.  If a party objects but does not oppose the entry into force of the treaty
between itself and the reserving State, then the provision likewise does not apply as between
the opposing State and the reserving State.  In such a situation, the reserving state would also
suffer the negative effect of its reservation – thereby incentivizing states not to make imper-
missible reservations to begin with. For further discussion on the dynamics of reciprocity in
international treaties, see for example, Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Res-
ervations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 537 (2002). For a more extensive discus-
sion of the role of reciprocity in international treaties see D.W. Grieg, Reciprocity,
Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (1994).
75. For a discussion of some of the challenges faced in the enforcement of human
rights treaties, see David Gartner, Transnational Rights Enforcement, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 1, 1 (2013); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE
L. J. 1935 (2002) (explaining the difficulties of enforcing human rights treaties).
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Court of Human Rights—mandated to issue binding judgments on state
parties.76
Numerous debates have arisen about how the law of treaties applies to
human rights agreements and how it may accommodate these special char-
acteristics. VCLT Articles 54 to 64 provide rules regarding the termination
of and withdrawal from treaties,77 and the Human Rights Committee of
the ICCPR has taken the position that the special characteristics of human
rights treaties have implications on the ability of contracting parties to ter-
minate or withdraw from their obligations. The key international human
rights treaties, including the international bill of rights trilogy, do not con-
tain any provisions regarding their termination and do not provide for de-
nunciation or withdrawal.78 According to VCLT Article 56, a treaty
containing no provision regarding its termination and which does not pro-
vide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or with-
drawal unless either (a) the “parties intended to admit the possibility of
denunciation or withdrawal[,]” or (b) “a right of denunciation or with-
drawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.”79
Following a highly controversial attempt by North Korea to withdraw
from the ICCPR in August 1997,80 the Human Rights Committee issued
General Comment 26, in which it concluded that the treaty was not capa-
ble of denunciation or withdrawal.81 Applying Article 56 of the VCLT to
the ICCPR, the committee found first that “the drafters of the Covenant
76. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR] (on the binding force and execu-
tion of judgments).
77. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, arts. 54–64 (regarding the termination and
suspension of the operation of treaties).
78. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.  However,
some human rights treaties do explicitly allow for withdrawal or denunciation. See, e.g., the
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 52, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CRC], stating that “[a] State Party may denounce the present Convention by written notifica-
tion to the Secretary-General of the United Nations” and the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 21, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 [hereinafter ICERD], stating that “[a] State Party may denounce this Convention by
written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”  Additionally, though
some treaties do not provide for termination, they do provide that under certain circum-
stances, human rights may be temporarily restricted. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 78, art. 4
(on derogation); Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment No. 29:
Article 4: Derogations During a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11
(Aug. 31, 2001).
79. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 56 (denunciation of or withdrawal from a
treaty containing no provision regarding termination, denunciation or withdrawal).
80. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#8 (last visited May 16, 2014).
81. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 26: Continuity of Obligations, ¶¶
4–5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997).
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deliberately intended to exclude the possibility of denunciation.”82 The
Human Rights Committee then examined the nature of the treaty, and
found that:
[T]he Covenant is not the type of treaty which, by its nature, im-
plies a right of denunciation. Together with the simultaneously
prepared and adopted International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, the Covenant codifies in treaty form the
universal human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the three instruments together often being re-
ferred to as the “International Bill of Rights”. As such, the Cove-
nant does not have a temporary character typical of treaties where
a right of denunciation is deemed to be admitted, notwithstanding
the absence of a specific provision to that effect.83
In accordance with the VCLT, the Human Rights Committee con-
cluded that the ICCPR is not capable of denunciation or withdrawal,84
and—by extension—the other instruments that make up the International
Bill of Rights.
The EU has asserted that because it is not a party to the international
human rights instruments it is not bound by them and that the EU legal
order is autonomous from international law. If so, then in transferring cer-
tain powers and functions to the EU spheres of competence, the Member
States would effectively be moving them outside the “jurisdiction” of the
international human rights treaties. In other words, by transferring their
powers, the Member States would effectively be withdrawing certain
spheres formerly covered by the human rights treaties to EU spheres of
competence, where they are not. This would constitute an invalid denunci-
ation or withdrawal from the treaties in violation of VCLT Article 56.
Article 27 of the VCLT further specifies that a State cannot justify a
failure to observe one of its international legal obligations by reference to
its domestic legal situation.85 Under the law of treaties, therefore, EU
Member States would not be able to justify a violation of a human rights
treaty within the sphere of EU competence on the basis of the asserted
special nature of the legal order of the EU or the fact that EU law has
supremacy in certain policy areas in a given Member State.
82. See id. ¶ 2.
83. Id. ¶ 3.
84. Id. ¶ 5.
85. Vienna Convention article 27 explicitly states that a party to a treaty “may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 27 (internal law and observance of treaties).  Article 46
further specifies that “a State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty
has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent . . .” Id. art. 46 (provisions of internal law regard-
ing competence to conclude treaties).  For a general discussion of the role of municipal rules
in international law, see Shaw, supra note 2, at 133–137.
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An alternative approach would be to assert that Member States con-
tinue to be bound by the international human rights treaties despite the
transfer of competence. The doctrine of state responsibility provides use-
ful guidance on the question of whether Member States can be held re-
sponsible for breaches that occur within the spheres of EU competence
where EU law is supreme. State responsibility is a fundamental principle
of international law arising out of the doctrines of state sovereignty and
equality of states, and which provides that a state incurs responsibility
when it commits an internationally unlawful act.86 Article 8 of the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility provides
that the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an
“act of a state” under international law “if the person or group of persons
is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that state in carrying out the conduct.”87 State control is more difficult to
prove within the EU context, in particular with the ECJ asserting the
supremacy of EU law over municipal law by the EU.
The ECtHR addressed this question in part in its landmark ruling on
the 1958 case of Kahn v. Federal Republic of Germany, where it held that:
[I]f a State contracts treaty obligations and subsequently con-
cludes another international agreement which disables it from
performing its obligations under the first treaty, it will be answera-
ble for any resulting breach of its obligations under the earlier
treaty[.]88
Several decades later in the 1998 case of Matthews v. UK, the ECtHR
explicitly found that Member State responsibility for a violation of the
ECHR continues even though the Member State may have transferred
competences with regard to those rights to an international organization.89
However, the holding was limited to EU primary law, which is most com-
parable to an international agreement independently entered into by the
Member States. The picture is less clear with regards to EU secondary law,
as will be discussed below. The doctrine of state responsibility thus sug-
gests that the Member States should be held responsible for breaches of
the international human rights treaties that might occur in the EU spheres
of competence.
A further area of public international law of relevance is the law of
state succession to treaties. Broadly put, the law of state succession to trea-
ties is intended to address situations where there has been a change in
sovereign authority over a particular territory and to provide rules gov-
86. See Shaw, supra note 2, at 778.
87. Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, art. 8, 53d Sess. (2001).
88. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 235/56, decision of the Commission
of 10 June 1958, 2 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 256, 300 (1958).
89. Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 32, 35 (1999),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58910. See infra for further dis-
cussion of this case.
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erning the transfer of participation in international agreements and the
continuity of the obligations and rights they prescribe. The special charac-
teristics of human rights treaties are also considered to have implications
on the application of the law of succession to treaties.
The Human Rights Committee addressed this issue in its General
Comment 26 of 1997, stating that:
The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living
in the territory of the State party. The Human Rights Committee
has consistently taken the view . . . that once the people are ac-
corded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such pro-
tection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them,
notwithstanding change in government of the State party, includ-
ing dismemberment in more than one State or State succession or
any subsequent action of the State party designed to divest them
of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant.90
In this view, the rights enumerated in the international human rights
covenants attach to the territory, of sorts, and continue to belong to the
individuals despite any change in government or authority. A new govern-
ment or authority would thus succeed automatically to the treaty and the
obligation to protect the rights under it would continue.
The question of automatic succession to human rights treaties was also
raised with regards to the Genocide Convention in the preliminary objec-
tions to the Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia-Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia) case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).91  Al-
though the court ultimately did not make a determination on the question
of state succession because it held Bosnia and Herzegovina was clearly a
party to the Genocide Convention on the date of the filing of its Applica-
tion,92 the issue was addressed in the separate opinions of Judge
Shahabuddeen and Judge Weeramantry. Judge Shahabuddeen argued that
the question of succession to the Genocide Convention should be resolved
through “an approach based on the special characteristics of the [Conven-
tion].”93 In order to give effect to the object and purpose of the Genocide
Convention, it “would fall to be construed as implying the expression of a
unilateral undertaking by each party to the Convention to treat successor
States as continuing as from independence any status which the predeces-
sor State had as a party to the Convention.”94 To find otherwise would
inescapably end up resulting in the introduction of “time-gap[s] in protec-
90. Human Rights Committee, supra note 81, ¶ 4.
91. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bos. and Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595, (July 11).
92. Id. at ¶ 23.
93. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 1996
I.C.J. 595, 634 (July 11).
94. Id. at 636.
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tion,” which would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the
Convention.95
In his separate opinion, Judge Weeramantry argued that it is “a princi-
ple of contemporary international law that there is automatic State succes-
sion to so vital a human rights convention as the Genocide Convention.”96
In support of this conclusion, he reasoned:
If the contention is sound that there is no principle of automatic
succession to human rights and humanitarian treaties, the strange
situation would result of the people within a State, who enjoy the
full benefit of a human rights treaty, such as the [ICCPR], . . .
being suddenly deprived of it as though these are special privi-
leges that can be given or withdrawn at the whim or fancy of Gov-
ernments . . . Such a legal position seems to be altogether
untenable, especially at this stage in the development of human
rights.97
Applied in the EU context, the law of succession to treaties would
mean that the EU should automatically succeed to the obligations of the
Member States with respect to international human rights treaties in those
spheres of competence where EU law is supreme. A failure to do so would
result precisely in a gap in protection and the withdrawal of rights at the
political whim of a government that Judges Shahabuddeen and Weera-
mantry argued were untenable.
Despite increasing literature about the law of international organiza-
tions, the international legal responsibility of international organizations
for violations of international human rights law has remained a conten-
tious topic.98 The law of state succession to treaties has traditionally ap-
plied where the territorial sovereignty of an area is passed from one state
to another,99 which is not the case with the EU. Some scholars have sug-
gested that a theory of functional succession should apply to international
and regional organizations that have assumed certain functions of their
Member States,100 and that such a theory is needed to address the very
real risk that states may attempt to skirt their duties under international
95. Id. at 635.
96. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. and Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, 1996
I.C.J. 595, 654 (July 11).
97. Id. at 649.
98. Robert McCorquodale, International Organisations and International Human
Rights Law: One Giant Leap for Humankind, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POWER: PER-
SPECTIVES ON LEGAL ORDER AND JUSTICE 141, 141 (Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad & Michael
Bohlander eds., 2009).
99. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, Aug. 23,
1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3. See also Shaw, supra note 2, at 966–84.
100. See, e.g., Noe¨lle Que´nivet, Binding the United Nations to Human Rights Norms by
way of the Laws of Treaties, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 587, 606–08 (2010); Robert
Uerpmann, International Law as an Element of European Constitutional Law: International
Supplementary Constitutions 31–32 (Max Planck Inst. For Comp. Pub. Law and Int’l Law,
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law by claiming that another institution is in charge.101 As discussed
above, the ECJ entertained this approach briefly with respect to the
GATT in the 1972 International Fruit case,102 but has since rejected it in
favor of a more conservative approach articulated in such subsequent
cases as Kadi. The theory of functional succession has yet to be codified in
international treaties or to achieve the status of customary international
law. Yet, if the ECJ claims that EU law is supreme in the EU spheres of
competence, the theory of functional succession seems the only way to
give effect to the object and purpose of the international human rights
covenants and ensure no gaps in protection arise.
Despite the special character of human rights treaties and the particu-
larities of the EU regime, an examination of the law of treaties, principle
of state responsibility, and the law of succession to treaties reveals that
traditional international law does provide key guidance with regards to the
challenge posed by the EU to the international human rights regime.
Under public international law, the Member States may not denounce or
withdraw from the obligations under international human rights treaties. It
further suggests, at least as has been interpreted by the ECtHR, that state
responsibility continues in spite of any transfer of competences by the
Member States to the EU. Another possible solution, though now largely
rejected by the ECJ, is the notion that the EU would succeed to the obli-
gations of its Member States under international human rights treaties
within the spheres of EU competence.
This Note now turns to examine how two key global actors have ad-
dressed the challenges posed by the EU to the international human rights
regime.
III. BETWEEN BOSPHORUS AND SOLANGE–THE TREATMENT OF THE
EU BY POTENTIAL EXTERNAL JUDICIAL CHECKS
As discussed above, the EU has defined EU law as supreme and the
ECJ as the supreme and final authority on human rights within the EU’s
spheres of competence. This Part will examine how two key actors which
could have functioned as judicial checks on the EU with regard to human
rights, the Member States and the ECtHR, have responded to the EU’s
assertion of this authority. Through the Bosphorus and Solange cases,
these two actors have established relationships of extreme deference to
the EU with regard to human rights. In so doing, they have in practice
made the ECJ the final judicial authority on human rights within the
spheres of EU competence. As a result, this Part argues, the EU is cur-
rently situated in a lacuna—largely unchecked by existing judicial institu-
Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03, 2003), available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/
papers/03/030901-02.pdf.
101. See Que´nivet, supra note 100, at 607.
102. Joined Cases 21-24/72, Int’l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit,
1972 E.C.R. I-1219, ¶ 7.
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tions that could have served as vehicles for the application of the
international human rights instruments.
A. The Relationship of the ECtHR to the EU
In July 2010, official talks began between the Council of Europe and
the EU on the EU’s accession to the ECHR.103 While negotiations are still
ongoing today, the negotiators took a critical step on April 5, 2013 and
finalized a draft accession agreement.104 According to the Council of Eu-
rope, accession will help “close a gap in human rights protection” in the
EU by “enhance[ing] consistency between the Strasbourg and Luxem-
bourg human rights systems,” and by affording citizens protection against
the action of the EU similarly to how they are currently protected against
the action of the Member States.105 Accession is also intended to formal-
ize and institutionalize a special relationship between the EU and the
ECHR.
Accession remains to be finalized, however, and until then the ECtHR
continues to define its relationship to the EU according to its case law, in
particular the seminal 2005 case of Bosphorus v. Ireland (“Bosphorus”).106
In Bosphorus, the ECtHR asserted its authority to review the acts of re-
gional organizations such as the EU and established a standard by which it
would review such action: the doctrine of equivalent protection.107 This
doctrine remains the standard of review used by the ECtHR today, and it
is expected that the doctrine of equivalent protection or a comparable
standard will remain the standard defining the relationship of the ECtHR
103. EU Accession to the Convention of Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://
hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention (last visited May 16,
2014).  Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which entered into force on June 1, 2010, provides the legal basis for the possibil-
ity of EU accession to the ECHR. See Press Release, Council of Europe, Reform of Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 Enters into Force, (May 31, 2010), available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1628875&Site=DC&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&Back
ColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE.  Article 6(2) TEU provides the legal
basis in EU law for accession, stating that “[t]he Union shall accede to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  Such accession
shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.” TEU post-Lisbon art.
6(2).
104. The draft accession agreement is currently under review by the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU). See Press Release, Council of Europe, Milestone Reached in
Negotiations on Accession of EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, (Apr. 5,
2013), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=DC-PR041%282013%29&Language
=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&
BackColorLogged=A9BACE.
105. Human Rights Europe, Accession of the European Union to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/
hrpolicy/accession /default_EN.asp? (Nov. 12, 2012).
106. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No.
45036/98, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx
?i=001-69564.
107. See discussion infra pp. 43–51.
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to the EU post-accession as well.108 On its face, Bosphorus appears to
assert the authority and ability of the ECtHR to function as an external
check on the EU’s human rights regime. Closer examination of the doc-
trine of equivalent protection reveals that it instead establishes a standard
of extreme deference, which largely amounts to an immunization of the
EU from review by the ECtHR.
The ECHR has been ratified by every Member State of the EU.109
The convention is overseen and enforced by the ECtHR, which can issue
binding judgments on state parties in response to applications lodged by
individuals, groups of individuals or one or more of the other contracting
parties.110 As discussed above, the EU derives its “general principles” and
“fundamental rights” in part from the ECHR.111 However, it is important
to remember that the scope of rights contained in the ECHR is limited,
focusing primarily on civil and political rights and including far fewer eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights than are covered in the key international
human rights treaties.112 With the transfer of competences from the Mem-
ber States to the EU, the question inevitably arose of whether acts by the
EU and its Member States within the EU spheres of competence would
also be covered by the ECHR and fall within the jurisdiction of the
ECtHR.
The ECtHR found itself in a dilemma. Depending on how it decided
the questions of EU and Member State responsibility and the continuity of
treaty obligations, the transfer of competences to the EU risked becoming
a means for the Member States to skirt their obligations under the ECHR.
With over half of the ECHR’s contracting parties also Member States of
the EU, the expanding scope and depth of EU competence in various pol-
icy areas also meant the ECtHR might lose oversight and authority over a
significant portion of its legal sphere. The significance and roles of the
ECHR and ECtHR were at risk. Perhaps most critically, the EU’s new
kind of legal order seemed to be creating a legal sphere of significant size
which would not be bound by external human rights instruments and judi-
cial mechanisms for controlling and ensuring the protection of human
rights.
The ECtHR attempted to address this dilemma in part in the 1999
case of Matthews v. UK (“Matthews”), where it examined the question of
the continuity of Member State obligations with regards to EU primary
108. See De Hert & Korenica, supra note 57, at 889–95.
109. Member States of the Council of Europe, as of May 16, 2014, COUNCIL OF EU-
ROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL
=ENG (last visited May 16, 2014).
110. See ECHR, supra note 76, art. 46.
111. See supra pp. 8–9 for a discussion of the source of the EU’s “general principles.”
112. See OHCHR STUDY, supra note 8, at 11. See also, e.g., EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
(2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/F8123ACC-5A5A-4802-86BE-8CD
A93FE58DF/0/RAPPORT_RECHERCHE_Droits_culturels_EN.pdf.
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law.113 EU primary law, as explained above, cannot be reviewed by the
ECJ as to its conformity with human rights standards, because the EU
judicial mechanisms do not have the power to invalidate provisions of EU
primary law.114 In Matthews, the ECtHR was asked to review whether a
piece of EU primary legislation, the European Community Act on Direct
Elections of 1976 (“1976 Act”) was in violation of the right to free elec-
tions as protected by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR.115 The
applicant was a British citizen and resident of Gibraltar who claimed that
her right to free elections under the ECHR had been violated when the
UK informed her that the 1976 Act did not extend the right to vote in
European Assembly elections to residents of Gibraltar.116 Even though
Gibraltar was bound by EU laws, had implemented EU legislation fully
and promptly, and Gibraltarians were EU citizens, Gibraltarians and other
EU citizens living in Gibraltar were not allowed to vote in the European
Assembly elections.117
The ECtHR ultimately found that Matthews’ right to free elections as
guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated.118 In the
opinion, the ECtHR also addressed the deeper question of whether a
Member State could be held responsible for a breach of the ECHR by a
provision of EU primary law, even though the acts of the European Com-
munity as such could not be challenged before the ECtHR because the
EU was not a contracting party.119 The U.K. argued, inter alia, that its
responsibility could not be engaged because it did not have the power of
effective control over the act complained of.120 Nevertheless, the ECtHR
found that the U.K. could be held responsible, and that the responsibility
of the U.K. for violations of the ECHR “continues” even after the U.K.
has transferred certain competences to the EU level.121
The Court observes that acts of the EC as such cannot be challenged
before the Court because the EC is not a contracting party. The Conven-
tion does not exclude the transfer of competences to international organi-
zations provided that Convention rights continue to be “secured.”122
Member States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a
transfer.123
Thus, according to the ECtHR, the Member States remained bound
by their obligations under the ECHR regardless of the transfer of compe-
113. Matthews, App. No. 24833/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
114. See supra note 56.
115. Matthews, at ¶¶ 7, 24.
116. Id. ¶¶ 14, 20, 61, 64.
117. Id. ¶¶ 7–19.
118. Id. ¶ 65.
119. Id. ¶ 32.
120. Id. ¶ 26.
121. Id. ¶ 32.
122. Id. ¶ 32.
123. Id.
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tence to the European level within the EU and independent of any claims
to the contrary by the ECJ on the basis of the supremacy of EU law.
The ECtHR’s finding on the continuity of Member State responsibil-
ity, however, is limited to EU primary law. In support of its finding, the
ECtHR explained that the 1976 Act, like the Maastricht Treaty, is an inter-
national instrument freely entered into by the U.K. and the other Member
States.124 The ECtHR stressed the fact that the 1976 Act was EU primary
law, highlighting how “the 1976 Act cannot be challenged before the
[ECJ] for the very reason that it is not a ‘normal’ act of the Community,
but is a treaty within the Community legal order.”125 As such, the U.K.
was “responsible ratione materiae . . . for the consequences of that
Treaty.”126 Through this reasoning, the ECtHR took a key step toward
resolving the problem of potential gaps in ECHR coverage within the EU
legal order, but it limited its holding to EU primary law.
In 2005, the ECtHR had an opportunity to examine whether the doc-
trine of equivalent protection might also apply to EU secondary law in
Bosphorus. EU secondary law includes, inter alia, unilateral acts such as
regulations, directives, decisions, opinions, and recommendations.127 In
Bosphorus, the ECtHR was asked to review an application brought by
Bosphorus Airways alleging that EC Council Regulation 990/93 imple-
menting UN Security Council Resolution 820 (1993) was in violation of
the ECHR and breached its rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (pro-
tection of property and peaceful enjoyment of possessions).128 The
ECtHR ultimately held that the impoundment of the Bosphorus Airways
aircraft by Ireland did not give rise to a violation of the ECHR.129 In arriv-
ing at this holding, however, the court addressed the critical question of
whether it had the authority to review acts of the EU, even though the EU
is not formally bound by the ECHR.
As mentioned above, the establishment of EU legal spheres of compe-
tence and supremacy raised the possibility that such spheres might not be
covered by the ECHR because the EU was not a party to the treaty. This
in turn would create gaps in Convention coverage in Europe. The ECtHR
expressed this concern explicitly in Bosphorus, when it recognized that
“absolving Contracting States completely from their Convention responsi-
bility in the areas covered by such a transfer [of competence] would be
incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention.”130 And in-
124. Id. ¶ 33.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See TFEU art. 288.  EU secondary law also includes a number of other sources,
such as communications and recommendations, white and green papers, and various Conven-
tions and Agreements.
128. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anoim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No.
45036/98, Eur. Ct.H.R. ¶¶ 3, 16 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i
=001-69564.
129. Id. ¶ 167.
130. Id. ¶ 154.
202 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:179
deed, treating the spheres of EU competence as falling outside the ambit
of the ECHR, would create a situation where, in the words of the court,
“the guarantees of the Convention could be limited or excluded at will,
thereby depriving it of its peremptory character and undermining the prac-
tical and effective nature of its safeguards.”131
By accepting the case, the ECtHR showed its willingness to engage
with applications claiming that EU law is in violation of the ECHR. As
explained by Paul De Hert and Fisnik Korenica, this acceptance in itself
demonstrated that the ECtHR felt it had the authority to review the acts
of regional organizations that are not formally a party to the ECHR.132
The ECtHR began by recognizing the supremacy of EU law in certain
areas and that EU law is binding on the Member States.133 It then found
that the interference with human rights at issue in the case was “not the
result of an exercise of discretion by the Irish authorities, either under
Community or Irish law, but rather amounted to compliance by the Irish
State with its legal obligations flowing from Community law” (here, Arti-
cle 8 of Regulation (EEC) no. 990/93).134 In so doing, the ECtHR thereby
framed the case as its reviewing of an act of the EU, even though it was
ultimately implemented by a Member State.
While on the one hand asserting its authority to review the compliance
of EU acts, the ECtHR also continued to maintain the position that it
could only hold the Member States—and not the EU—responsible for any
violations. The ECtHR recognized that contracting parties could transfer
sovereign power to an international organization, yet it continued to find
that the holder of the transferred sovereign power (here the EU) “is not
itself held responsible under the Convention for proceedings before, or
decisions of, its organs as long as it is not a Contracting Party.”135 Rather,
it is the contracting party, which is responsible for all the acts and omis-
sions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question
was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with
international legal obligations.136
Thus, at least superficially, the ECtHR seems to have articulated a
legal paradigm that would ensure there are no gaps in its coverage within
Europe due to EU spheres of competency. While the court could not hold
the EU itself responsible, it would nevertheless be able to review EU acts
(i.e. secondary law) via the theory of the continuing responsibility of the
contracting parties as implementers of binding EU law. Thus, at least on a
superficial level, this set-up appears to address the problem of potential
gaps in ECHR coverage. This Note now turns to address the standard the
131. Id.
132. De Hert & Korenica, supra note 57, at 881.
133. See, e.g., Bosphorus, App. No. 45036/98, Eur. Ct. ¶¶ 92, 95, 147.
134. Id. ¶ 148.
135. Id. ¶ 152.
136. Id. ¶ 153.
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ECtHR established to review the compliance of EU acts: the doctrine of
equivalent protection.
In Bosphorus, the ECtHR established the doctrine of equivalent pro-
tection as the standard by which it would review EU secondary law. In
essence, the doctrine creates a rebuttable presumption that an interference
with a right by EU secondary law is justified. The doctrine of equivalent
protection differs from the standard of deference the ECtHR applies to
the contracting states, known as the “margin of appreciation doctrine,”
and according to which the law accords a certain margin of discretion or
‘room for manoeuvre’ to public authorities.137 Over the years, the margin
of appreciation doctrine has developed into a complex standard, tailored
to take into account the specificities of the issues raised in a given case and
the particular human rights system of the country at hand.138 While this
Note will not engage in a detailed analysis of the margin of appreciation
doctrine here, suffice it to say that it constitutes a more restrictive stan-
dard of deference than that created by the ECtHR in Bosphorus for the
EU. The doctrine of equivalent protection, this Note argues, functions
largely to immunize EU acts from review by the ECtHR.
The doctrine of equivalent protection was created to accommodate
what the ECtHR identified as a legitimate general-interest of compliance
with Community law by a contracting party.139
The Court has long recognized the growing importance of interna-
tional cooperation and of the consequent need to secure the proper func-
tioning of international organizations.140
The court thus developed the doctrine of equivalent protection be-
cause it felt “international cooperation” was an interest worth protecting
in itself, and an interest that was important enough to justify an interfer-
ence with a right protected by the ECHR.141 In other words, the margin of
deference accorded under the doctrine essentially reflects the weight as-
signed by the Court to this general interest.
According to the doctrine of equivalent protection, an interference
with a right is presumed to be proportionate if the regional organization in
question (here the EU) disposes of a system of “equivalent” or “compara-
ble” protection of human rights obligations derived from the ECHR.142
The interference is considered justified
137. For a thorough discussion of the margin of appreciation doctrine, see, for example,
Giulio Itzcovich, One, None and One Hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations: The
Lautsi Case, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 292 (2013). See also, YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI,
THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (2002) (analyzing the case-law of the ECHR with re-
spect to the margin of appreciation); Michael Hutchinson, The Margin of Appreciation Doc-
trine in the European Court of Human Rights, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 638 (1999).
138. See Itzcovich, supra note 137, at 292–97.
139. Bosphorus, App. No. 45036/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 150.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 155.
142. Id.
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as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect funda-
mental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered
and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner
which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the
Convention provides . . .143
If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the or-
ganization, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the
requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement
legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organization.144
Even if the system is found to be equivalent, however, the presump-
tion may be rebutted if there is evidence that the protection afforded was
“manifestly deficient.”145 Thus, only in the case of manifest deficiency
would the ECtHR consider the general interest of compliance with EU
law to be outweighed.146 In other words, if the protection was deficient—
but just not manifestly so—the general interest in compliance with Com-
munity law would outweigh the interference with an individual’s right at
issue.
This framing of the standard is problematic and raises concerns with
regards to the protection of human rights in Europe. In essence, the
ECtHR is saying that it is willing to cede its role as external check on
potential human rights violations in the spheres of EU competence, so
long as the EU’s human rights system is not manifestly deficient. The
equivalent protection doctrine creates a sphere within the EU legal order,
which the ECtHR will not touch. If the equivalent protection doctrine
standard is met, the ECtHR explains, then the general-interest in compli-
ance with the law of a regional organization will outweigh what it refers to
as “the [ECHR]’s role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public
order’ in the field of human rights.”147 Under the veil of this seemingly
innocuous language, however, the Court is in fact saying that it is willing to
sacrifice its oversight and review of certain violations of human rights so
long as the overall EU human rights system is not manifestly deficient.
There is no doubt, within this view, that the equivalent protection doctrine
creates a significant lacuna within the European legal sphere where human
rights violations may occur without the external check of the ECHR.
The ECtHR then proceeds to apply the equivalent protection doctrine
to the case at hand, but does so in a superficial and less than rigorous
manner which almost suggests a precocious presumption of equivalence
and compliance. The ECtHR first finds that the protection of fundamental
rights by Community law can be considered to be equivalent to that of the
Convention system.148 Following a cursory examination of the EU Trea-
143. Id.




148. Id. ¶ 165.
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ties and passing reference to ECJ case law (which it does not examine in
depth or detail), the ECtHR concludes that sufficient substantive guaran-
tees are in place.149 The Court then examines the mechanisms of control
in place to ensure the observance of these guarantees, and determines that
these are likewise adequate.150 Without examining in any fastidious man-
ner the actual application of these mechanisms, the record of judicial re-
view or the quality of the application of the guarantees, the ECtHR then
concludes that the mechanisms are also up to par because actions can be
initiated before the ECJ and the ECJ maintains its control on the applica-
tion by national courts of Community law.151
Although the ECtHR in Bosphorus examines both the substantive
guarantees afforded by EU law and the mechanisms in place to ensure
their observance, it does not inquire into the actual application of these
mechanisms or the ECJ’s interpretations and definition of the different
human rights. Surely individual countries such as the Germany, France or
even Russia would pass so cursory a test—yet the ECtHR has not ac-
corded them the same level of deference as it accords the EU via the
equivalent protection doctrine.
Although the EU is a regional and in certain respects a supranational
organization, the ECJ’s authority with regard to human rights applies to
those spheres of competence where EU law is supreme. In those spheres
of competence, the EU has final and binding authority—acting in a state-
like capacity comparable to that exercised by other contracting states
within their national legal orders. It is unclear why the ECtHR does not
feel a more rigorous and deep analysis of the EU system is warranted, and
the Court fails to provide any justification for this underlying assumption
and consequent special treatment of the EU.
A further weakness in the doctrine is the lack of clarity surrounding
when and how frequently the equivalence test will be applied. The Court
specifies that “any such finding of equivalence could not be final and
would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in fun-
damental rights protection.”152 However, the ECtHR does not specify
how often or under what circumstances such a revision of its finding of
equivalent protection might occur. Assuming the ECtHR’s analysis of the
equivalence of the EU human rights system is correct, one can easily imag-
ine a situation where the system begins to fall apart, or the ECJ interprets
or applies certain rights in contravention of the ECHR—but the ECtHR
fails to re-examine the question of equivalence and thus does not ensure
rectification of the violation. In any case, the equivalence test reveals a
strong and unjustified deference to the EU.
After finding that the presumption applies to the EU, the ECtHR
turns next to examine whether it may nevertheless be rebutted in the case
149. Id. ¶ 159.
150. Id. ¶¶ 163–65.
151. Id. ¶¶ 163–64.
152. Id. ¶ 155.
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at hand through a showing of “manifest deficiency.” The Court’s analysis
here is also sparse and suggests a further problematically superficial test
for determining manifest deficiency. The Court mentions having regard to
the nature of the interference, the general interest pursued by the im-
poundment of the aircraft, the sanctions regime and the ruling of the
ECJ.153 It then finds, unsupported by analysis, that there has been “no
dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the observance of Convention
rights” and concludes that the protection of the applicant company’s Con-
vention rights was not manifestly deficient.154
While the ECtHR’s analysis and support for its finding of no manifest
deficiency is sparse, it suggests that the ECtHR will base its determination
significantly, if not solely, on an inquiry into whether the existing mecha-
nisms of control have dysfunctioned in the particular case at hand. Again
here, the ECtHR limits its review to a superficial consideration of the con-
trol mechanisms in the EU, rather than a substantive inquiry into the ap-
plication and interpretation of human rights—which would seem a more
appropriate point of departure when the potential violation of human
rights are at stake. As with its application of the equivalence test, the
ECtHR’s determination of manifest deficiency also seems to be based on
the very presumption of compliance it is meant to be assessing.
An analysis of Matthews and Bosphorus has revealed that the legal
sphere covered by the ECHR and the ECtHR in Europe is one marked by
a lacuna with regards to the EU. In Matthews, the ECtHR found that it
can review the conformity of EU primary law with the ECHR on the basis
of the continued responsibility of the Member States despite the transfer
of competences to the EU, but this holding was limited to EU primary
law.155 In Bosphorus, the ECtHR found that it could review the compli-
ance of EU secondary law, but created a special standard, the doctrine of
equivalent protection, which essentially immunizes a significant legal
sphere within the EU from review by the ECtHR. Although the doctrine
of equivalent protection formally recognized and created a legal basis for
the ECtHR to review EU secondary law, the equivalence and manifest
deficiency elements of the standard grants significant deference to the EU
and ECJ, thereby also formally limiting the extent to which the ECtHR
can function as an external judicial check on the EU human rights regime.
Paul de Hert and Fisnik Korenica have raised the argument that the
ECtHR developed the doctrine of equivalent protection “because of the
fear that the Luxembourg Court would refuse to accept a ruling of the
Strasbourg Court.”156 The language of the opinions suggests that the
ECtHR attempted to engage with and accommodate the EU in order to
avoid gaps in coverage and to mitigate the ability of the contracting parties
to skirt their international obligations under the ECHR through the trans-
153. Id. ¶ 166.
154. Id.
155. De Hert & Korenica, supra note 57, at 883.
156. Id. at 880.
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fer of competences to the EU level. Whatever its reasons and motivations,
the ECtHR has also created a significant lacuna in its coverage. As a re-
sult, significant spheres of EU competence, including its human rights re-
gime, have arisen outside the grasp of the external judicial check and
control which the ECtHR could have provided.
B. The Relationship of the Member States to the EU
I turn now to examine the second actor on the global stage which had
the potential to function as an external judicial check on the EU human
rights regime: the Member States themselves. As discussed above, the
Member States are of particular interest because they are bound by the
broad spectrum of international human rights treaties. Thus, unlike the
ECtHR, which is confined to applying and enforcing the more limited
scope of rights guaranteed in the ECHR, the provision of an external judi-
cial check by the Member States held the potential of ensuring that the full
panoply of human rights instruments and law might bind the EU indirectly
via the Member States themselves. Again here, however, the Member
States have established a relationship of extreme deference to the EU
human rights regime, allowing the EU to emerge largely unchecked by
external judicial mechanisms.
The Member States have taken different approaches to accommodat-
ing or incorporating the principle of the supremacy of EU law first as-
serted by the ECJ in Costa v. ENEL. These approaches reflect the
different constitutional traditions of the Member States as well as the dif-
ferent ways they each define the relationship between international and
municipal law. For purposes of my analysis here, I will focus on the ap-
proach taken by Germany and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany, in the critical 1986 Solange II case. Ger-
many provides an ideal prism through which to examine this relationship,
both because Germany is considered to have one of the least deferential
standards of the Member States and because the Bundesverfassungsgericht
has become in many respects the locus for negotiating the limits of the
supremacy of the EU with respect to fundamental rights.
Germany has adopted a dualist-like approach to defining the relation-
ship of municipal law, including the German Constitution, or German Ba-
sic Law, to Community law. Generally, this means that the German courts
have derived the binding force of Community law from the German con-
stitutional principle of observance of international law in good faith rather
than from the distinctive nature of the Community legal order and its au-
tonomy.157 In other words, the municipal courts have rejected the hierar-
chy of legal acts asserted by the ECJ, whereby the acts of national law,
including the Constitution, are subject to the unconditional supremacy of
EU law.158
157. Roman Kwiecie´n, The Primacy of European Union Law over National Law Under
the Constitutional Treaty, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1479, 1488 (2005).
158. Id.
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Germany defined the exact character of the relationship of German
municipal law to EU law in large part in the Solange saga. The story began
with the 1970 ECJ case of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr-
und Vorratsstelle Getreide. The case involved a possible conflict between
EC regulations and the German Constitution. The applicant in the case
argued that the EC regulation at issue should be invalidated due to its
conflict with the German Constitution. The ECJ held that not even a fun-
damental principle of municipal constitutional law could be invoked to
challenge the supremacy of directly applicable Community law, stating,
“the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State
cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamen-
tal rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles
of its constitutional structure.”159 The ECJ thereby sought to create and
assert its primacy over all municipal law, including national Constitutions
and national interpretations of fundamental principles.
Germany responded to this assertion of supremacy and authority a
few years later in the 1974 case of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft von
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fu¨r Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I) before
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Federal Constitutional Court of Ger-
many. While the Court had generally accepted the supremacy of Commu-
nity law in previous cases regarding various types of law, it was more
hesitant with the question of whether Community law could take primacy
over the inalienable fundamental rights contained in the German Basic
Law. The Court was especially concerned with avoiding a situation where
the supremacy of EU law might result in gaps in protection for German
citizens, such as might occur where national constitutions give stronger
guarantees of rights for their citizens than does the Community:160
In so far as citizens of [Germany] have a claim to judicial protec-
tion of their fundamental rights guaranteed in the Basic Law, their
status cannot suffer any impairment merely because they are di-
rectly affected by legal acts . . . which are based on Community
law. Otherwise, a perceptible gap in judicial protection might arise
precisely for the most elementary status rights of the citizen.161
The Court held that in light of the present state of evolution of the
EU, it would not renounce its right to uphold German fundamental rights
in the face of a conflict with Community law.162 The Bundesverfassung-
sgericht stated its particular concern with the following deficiencies in the
159. Case 11/70, Int’l Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide, 1970
E.C.R. 1125, 1134.
160. Bundesverfassungsgerich [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 37, 271 CMLR 540, ¶ 6
(Ger.), translated in THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL LAW: FOREIGN LAW TRANSLA-
TIONS (1974), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_
new/german/case.php?id=588.
161. Id.
162. Id. ¶ 4.
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European Community: (a) the lack of a democratically elected parliament
directly elected by general suffrage and to which the Community organs
empowered to legislate are fully responsible on a political level, and (b)
the lack of a codified catalogue of fundamental rights.163 Through the de-
cision, the Court impliedly rejected the principle of the supremacy of EU
law, at least with regards to the delineation and interpretation of funda-
mental rights.
In light of the ECJ’s further development of a doctrine of fundamental
rights in subsequent cases, the Bundesverfassungsgericht modified its ap-
proach in the 1986 case Re Wu¨nsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II). In
the decision, the Court held:
In view of those developments it must be held that, so long as the
European Communities, in particular European Court case law,
generally ensure effective protection of fundamental rights as
against the sovereign powers of the Communities which is to be
regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental
rights required unconditionally by the Basic Law, and in so far as
they generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental
rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its
jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Commu-
nity legislation cited as the legal basis for any acts of German
courts or authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, and it will no longer review such legis-
lation by the standard of the fundamental rights contained in the
Basic Law; references to the Court under Article 100 (1) for that
purpose are therefore inadmissible.164
Thus, in Solange II, the Court established a standard, whereby so long
as the ECJ had a level of protection of fundamental rights substantially in
concurrence with the protections afforded by the German Constitution
they would no longer review specific Union acts in light of their own
constitution.
The Solange II principle established a highly deferential standard for
review of EU law by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The Court concluded
that the European Communities met the standard of generally ensuring
effective protection in a manner substantially similar to that required by
German Basic Law.165 On the basis of its finding of substantial similarity,
the Bundesverfassungsgericht declared that it would no longer review sec-
ondary EU law according to its municipal standards for fundamental
rights. Although the opinion technically leaves open the possibility that
163. Id.
164. Bundesverfassungsgerich [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 1986,
1987 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 73, 339 (Ger.),3
CMLR 225, para. f, translated in THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL LAW: FOREIGN LAW
TRANSACTIONS (1974), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnation
al/work_new/german/case.php?id=572 (emphasis added).
165. Id. paras. d–e.
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Germany might someday decide that the EU human rights system does
not in fact ensure effective protection in a manner substantially similar to
that required by German Basic Law, it did not specify when and how this
standard would be reviewed. In so doing, the Court formally limited both
its own scope of authority and that of municipal law to function as an
external check on EU law and the EU human rights regime.
The parallels between the approach of the ECtHR and the
Bundesverfassungsgericht in Solange II are striking. In fact, Solange II
served as a model for the doctrine of equivalent protection created by the
ECtHR.166 In comparison, the Solange II standard is arguably still more
deferential than that of the ECtHR. In contrast to the doctrine of
equivalent protection, which allows for the presumption of EU compliance
to be rebutted through a showing of manifest deficiency (no matter how
arguably inadequate the standard), the Bundesverfassungsgericht has extri-
cated itself entirely from any authority to conduct a review of EU acts and
law on the basis of external principles so long as the EU system is “sub-
stantially similar” to its own. In so doing, it also eradicated the possibility
that the Member States could have functioned as an external check on the
EU definition of rights.
As the Member States have ratified and are bound by most interna-
tional human rights treaties, occupying the role of external check would
have enabled Member States to rectify or refuse to implement EU acts
and law which were in violation of the international human rights treaties.
In refusing to review EU secondary law on the basis of municipal (exter-
nal) standards, the Member States have closed off this possibility. This in
turn has effectively allowed a significant legal sphere within the EU, in-
cluding the EU human rights regime, to arise unchecked by the interna-
tional human rights regime (as applied by the Member States).
In conclusion, this Part has examined how two key actors who could
have functioned as external judicial checks on the EU human rights re-
gime, the ECtHR and the Member States, have responded to the EU’s
assertion of primacy and supremacy in this area. A close examination of
the Bosphorus and Solange II standards reveals a legal landscape where
the EU arises largely unchecked by external human rights standards. Both
actors appear to have affirmed the EU’s self-definition as final judicial
authority on human rights within the spheres of EU competence, thereby
allowing a lacuna to form in the international human rights regime.
IV. DESPITE THE LACUNA, IS THE EU ENSURING COMPLIANCE
OF ITS OWN ACCORD?
As examined previously, and as reflected in the EU instruments and
ECJ case law, the EU does not consider itself bound directly by the inter-
national human rights instruments. Due to the standards of extreme defer-
ence established by the ECtHR and Member States, the EU in practice
emerges as the final judicial authority on human rights within the legal
166. De Hert & Korenica, supra note 57, at 878.
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spheres of EU competence. Within this frame, the EU unquestionably sits
in a lacuna in the international human rights regime. In spite of this gap
and despite the EU’s explicit rejection of any binding authority of these
treaties, this Note turn now to address a further question. Does the EU
nevertheless engage with or attempt compliance with the international
human rights treaties in its delineation and definition of human rights of
its own accord? The picture is discouraging and further reinforces the con-
cern that the EU is emerging as a legal sphere outside the international
human rights regime.
First, the EU’s use of and reference to international human rights in-
struments when delineating and interpreting rights has been sporadic and
inconsistent at best. As discussed previously, the EU treaties and the CFR
make no explicit reference to international human rights instruments. One
minor exception to this is Article 18 of the CFR on the right to asylum,
which makes reference to the Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, stating that the right to asylum shall be guaranteed “with due respect
for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of
31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees . . .”167 No comparable
reference is made to the fundamental human rights treaties such as the
ICCPR and ICESCR.
The lack of reference to the key international human rights instru-
ments is not for lack of trying and advocacy by the monitoring bodies of
the treaties. During the drafting process of the CFR, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights even issued a statement to the Con-
vention to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
expressing its concerns about the lack of explicit reference to the interna-
tional treaties.168
Furthermore, the Committee, while noting that in the explanatory
notes to each draft article on economic and social rights ample reference
to the European law sources is provided, no reference to the relevant eco-
nomic and social rights’ obligations existing under the International Bill of
Human Rights, i.e. under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee in
this connection welcomes draft amendments proposed by delegates to the
Convention making express reference to such treaty obligations.169 This
concern, however, was not heeded.
The case law of the ECJ has proven no more fruitful, again in spite of
efforts by the monitoring bodies of the treaties and the OHCHR to engage
with the court and parties. On several occasions, the Human Rights Com-
mittee of the ICCPR has put itself before the ECJ as a source of inspira-
167. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 49, art. 18.
168. COMM. ON ECON., SOC., AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, Statement of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Convention to draft a Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, ¶ 6, available at www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/
statements/EU.doc (last visited May 16, 2014).
169. Id.
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tion for recognizing a general principle on several occasions.170 Israel de
Jesus Butler and Olivier De Schutter explain how while the ECJ has at
times superficially recognized the significance of the ICCPR, stating “it
has not been possible to find a case where [the ECJ] has actually relied
upon its provisions.”171 This is concerning as the ECJ could easily consult
and refer to the HRC and ICCPR, even if only as persuasive authority.
In some instances, the ECJ has even overtly dismissed the relevance
and authority of the Human Rights Committee. In the 1998 ECJ case of
Grant v. South West Trains, the ECJ explicitly dismissed and ruled con-
trary to an Advisory Opinion of the Human Rights Committee.172 The
case addressed the question of whether discrimination on the basis of sex
included discrimination based on the employee’s sexual orientation.173
The applicant, Ms. Grant, was employed by South West Trains, and her
employment contract granted travel concessions to her “spouse and de-
pend[a]nts.”174 Ms. Grant applied for the concessions for her female part-
ner, but South West Trains refused to grant them on grounds that
unmarried persons were only entitled to concessions if their partner was of
the opposite sex.175
The ECJ held that discrimination on the basis of sex did not include
sexual orientation.176 However, it did so in explicit disregard of the Advi-
sory Opinion of the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR, which had
advised that “sex . . . is to be taken as including sexual orientation.”177
Although the ECJ did make reference to the Advisory Opinion in the
judgment, it did not engage with it or accord it any, even persuasive,
weight. The ECJ justified its disregard of the Advisory Opinion on the
grounds that the Human Rights Committee is “not a judicial institution
and [its] findings have no binding force in law.”178 Interestingly, the hold-
ing in South West Trains would later be rendered null by the adoption of
the Employment Equality Directive in 2000, prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.179
It is true that the Human Rights Committee’s opinion was not binding
on the ECJ, as the EU was not a party to the ICCPR and the Committee’s
interpretation of the meaning of “discrimination on the basis of sex” had
not yet achieved the status of customary international law. Nevertheless, it
is concerning that the ECJ accorded it no authority whatsoever and dis-
170. Butler, supra note 55, at 282.
171. See id.
172. Case C-249/, Grant v South West Trains Ltd, 1998 E.C.R. I-621.
173. Id. ¶¶ 24–37.
174. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
175. Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
176. Id. ¶ 50.
177. Id. ¶ 46.
178. Id.
179. EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON EURO-
PEAN NON-DISCRIMINATION LAW, 14 (2010), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Handbook_non_discri_law_ENG_01.pdf.
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missed it with a seeming slight of the hand. Of further concern, is the fact
that the United Kingdom (the country of nationality of South West Trains)
opted to follow the interpretation of the ECJ over that of the Human
Rights Committee.
The case reveals a two-pronged problem. On the one hand, the ECJ
chose to delineate and interpret rights within its spheres of competence in
a way that was knowingly and explicitly contrary to the position taken by
the Human Rights Committee. On the other hand, the U.K., which has
ratified and is bound by the ICCPR,180 chose to comply with the ECJ’s
interpretation, rather than with the Advisory Opinion of the ICCPR. The
case illustrates the way in which the ECJ’s disregard for international
human rights law and instruments challenges the international human
rights regime as a whole. While it may not have been the intent of the
U.K. with regard to this case, South West Trains reveals the very real risk
that Member States may use the transfer of competences to the EU as a
means of skirting their responsibilities under international human rights
law.
It also reveals that the EU may function as a pull factor, inducing
Member States not to comply with their obligations under international
human rights instruments. The OHCHR expressed its concern that a two-
tiered system of protection may develop in the EU between those areas
covered by national law and those falling within the competence of the
EU:
There are numerous areas of EU law where potential for conflict
arises between the obligations incurred under [ ] human rights
treaties and obligations deriving from EU law. Member States
may elect to give priority to their obligations under EU law, which
the EU doctrine of supremacy obliges them to do.181
Within the frame of South West Trains, compliance with the ECJ
meant refusing to comply with the Human Rights Committee’s Advisory
Opinion—and the U.K. chose compliance with the ECJ. With no formal
judicial body and weak enforcement mechanisms, the international human
rights instruments have little chance of exerting any comparable form of
pressure on the Member States to ensure compliance.
A further area where the EU has manifested its disregard for interna-
tional human rights instruments relates to the scope of the rights included
in the EU human rights regime. As discussed above, the EU derives its
“general principles” from the ECHR and the constitutional traditions of
the Member States. However, international human rights treaties cover a
far wider range of economic, social and cultural rights than the ECHR,
180. ICCPR Status of Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available
at https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&chapter=4&lang
=en (last updated Mar. 14, 2014).
181. OHCHR STUDY, supra note 8, at 6, 21.
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which focuses primarily on civil and political rights.182 A number of inter-
national human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child,183 also recognize rights in far greater detail and depth than the
ECHR.184 In a 2012 report, the OHCHR expressed its concern that “[t]o
the extent that EU Law fails to recognise and reflect the greater scope and
depth of Member States’ obligations as they exist in the [ ] human rights
treaties, individuals within EU territory face a denial of their basic
rights.”185
At the time of the drafting of the CFR, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights had also expressed concern about the scope of
rights covered by the draft CFR. The Committee was worried that a fail-
ure to integrate economic and social rights on an equal footing with civil
and political rights would amount to a violation by the Member States of
the obligation under Article 2(1) of the Covenant to “achiev[e] progres-
sively the full realization of the rights recognized”186 in the Covenant.187
A failure to integrate economic and social rights would send “negative
regional signals [that] would be highly detrimental to the full realization of
all human rights at both the international and domestic levels, and would
have to be regarded as a retrogressive step contravening the existing obli-
gations of [M]ember States.”188
A further issue arises where EU law specifies minimum standards to
be implemented and applied by the Member States, but these fall below
the standards required by international law. Framed as minimum stan-
dards, EU law is arguably not technically in contravention of international
law, but they do create a very strong incentive for Member States to vio-
late their international obligations. With Member States only facing reper-
cussions within the EU if they fail to follow EU law, it is no surprise if
their “good will” to follow international human rights treaties with no en-
forcement mechanisms falters.
One such set of minimum standards are codified in the EU Qualifica-
tion Directive, which sets standards for determining who qualifies as a ref-
182. Id. at 11. See also, e.g., ECHR, CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE CASE-LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RESEARCH DIVISION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, (2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/F8123ACC-5A5
A-4802-86BE-8CDA93FE58DF/0/RAPPORT_RECHERCHE _Droits_culturels_EN.pdf (il-
lustrating the approach of the European Court of human Rights towards cultural rights).
183. See generally CRC, supra note 78.
184. See Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 49. See also Press Release, Council
of Europe, Factsheet – Children’s rights (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Doc-
uments/FS_Childrens_ENG.pdf (discussing children’s rights covered by the ECHR).
185. OHCHR STUDY, supra note 8, at 21.
186. ICESCR, supra note 78, art. 2(1).
187. Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Con-
vention to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 49, ¶ 4,
available at, www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/EU.doc.
188. Id.
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ugee and elaborates the content of international protection.189 The
Qualification Directive states that “Member States should have the power
to introduce or maintain more favourable provisions than the standards
laid down in th[e] Directive.”190 Unlike most EU legislation, the Qualifi-
cation Directive also makes express reference to the governing interna-
tional treaty, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee
Convention”), and states that the Refugee Convention is “the cornerstone
of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees.”191
Nevertheless, the Qualification Directive sets some standards that fall
short of those required by the Refugee Convention. For example, the Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees specifies in article 18 that States
shall accord the right to self-employment to refugees when they are “law-
fully in their territory.”192 Under the Refugee Convention, a refugee is
considered to be “lawfully in” the territory of a host state in any of the
following three situations: (a) when a refugee has been admitted to a state
party’s territory for a fixed period of time, even if only for a few hours; (b)
during the stage between “irregular” presence and the recognition or de-
nial of refugee status, including the time required for exhaustion of any
appeals or reviews, and (c) when States divert refugees into so-called
“temporary protection” regimes.193 In contrast, the Qualification Direc-
tive authorizes refugees to engage in self-employment only “after [refugee
status] has been granted.”194 The standard of the European Union regard-
ing the right to self-employment is thus more restrictive than the interna-
tional legal standard.
The Qualification Directive is a mix of standards that are lower,
higher and the same as those required by Refugee Convention. It serves as
a worrying example of how EU law, even when it expressly recognizes the
governing international human rights instruments, treats international
human rights law as a menu of rights to be selected from at will and with
discretion. Faced only with direct repercussions if they fail to follow EU
law, Member States are only happy to skirt their international legal obliga-
tions regarding the rights of refugees.
189. See, e.g., Council Directive 2011/95/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 337/9), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:337:0009:0026:EN:PDF [hereinaf-
ter Qualification Directive]. Article 3 specifies that “Member States may introduce or retain
more favourable standards for determining who qualifies as a refugee or as a person eligible
for subsidiary protection, and for determining the content of international protection, in so
far as those standards are compatible with this Directive.” Id. art. 3.
190. Id. pmbl. ¶ 14.
191. Id. pmbl. ¶ 4; see supra p. 20 for a discussion of EU legislation
192. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 18, Jul. 28, 1951 189 U.N.T.S.
2545 [hereinafter Refugee Convention], supplemented by the Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791 (emphasis added).
193. For a discussion of the meaning of “lawful presence” in the Refugee Convention,
see JAMES HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011),
173–84. For a detailed discussed of the five-stage level of attachment system set out in the
Refugee Convention for the accrual of rights for refugees, see id. at 154–192.
194. Qualification Directive, supra note 189, art. 26(1).
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This Part has examined the extent to which the EU has engaged with
or overtly attempted compliance with the international human rights trea-
ties in its delineation and definition of human rights. The picture is bleak.
Despite the efforts of the monitoring bodies of key human rights treaties
to ensure mention of and reference to those treaties, the EU’s use of and
reference to these treaties has been sporadic at best. In South West Trains,
the ECJ went so far as to explicitly dismiss and disregard an Advisory
Opinion of the Human Rights Committee. Of further concern is the scope
of the rights included in the EU human rights regime, which covers only a
small portion of the human rights enumerated in the international human
rights instruments, and which technically bind the Member States.
In light of this analysis, it would appear that any extent to which the
EU is in compliance with international human rights law is by virtue of its
reliance on the ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the Member
States to define its “general principles.” Thus, I would argue, any measure
of compliance by the EU is coincidental, rather than deliberate. Problems
arise where the sources relied on by the EU are themselves deficient or
inadequate, such as where a Member State fails to comply with its interna-
tional human rights obligations or how the scope of the ECHR is limited
to only a small portion of international human rights.
CONCLUSION
This Note has sought to demonstrate the way in which the EU is situ-
ated in a lacuna in the international human rights regime. To echo a con-
cern expressed by the OHCHR, the EU and its current legal framework
for human rights strike at the heart of the principle of universality on
which human rights rests, both legally and conceptually.
Through the principles of supremacy and autonomy created and ce-
mented in such seminal cases as Costa v. ENEL, Internationale Handel-
sgesellschaft and Kadi, the ECJ has defined the EU as an entity
autonomous from other bodies of international law, including interna-
tional human rights law. In recognizing the internal supremacy and pri-
macy of EU law over municipal law in the area of human rights through
the highly deferential Solange II standard, the Member States have lent
credence and affirmation to this assertion of authority. In so doing, the
Member States, although themselves bound by the international human
rights instruments, extinguished the possibility that they might function as
an external check on the EU human rights regime and as a means of indi-
rectly binding the EU to international human rights law.
The ECtHR in Bosphorus created a similar deferential standard,
which essentially amounts to an immunization of EU secondary legislation
from review by the ECtHR. Between Solange and Bosphorus, the EU
human rights regime, as it has defined itself, arises largely unchecked by
any external judicial review mechanisms. In the absence of such external
checks, the EU is left to ensure compliance with the international human
rights instruments on its own initiative and goodwill, but the track record
is bleak. The EU treaties make no reference to international human rights
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instruments, and ECJ case law references have been sporadic at best, with
not a single case relying expressly on an international human rights instru-
ment to define and interpret a right within the EU human rights regime.
Situated in such a lacuna, the EU provides a critical example of how
regional supranational organizations pose a threat to the international
human rights regime. First, the EU has defined itself (largely affirmed by
the Member States and ECtHR) as autonomous from this regime. As the
EU has supremacy in its various and expanding areas of competence, this
situation creates gaps in coverage by the instruments. To the extent that
the EU exerts state-like functions in these areas of competence, there is no
justification for exempting the EU from the international human rights
regime. Second, such exemption of EU spheres of competence also places
spheres traditionally and arguably still within the jurisdiction of the Mem-
ber States beyond the reach of international human rights instruments.
According to the law of treaties, the responsibility of the Member States
does not end with regard to its obligations under international human
rights treaties when it transfers competence to the EU. Nevertheless, the
Member States appear to have acquiesced to this situation, allowing gaps
in coverage to form within their territory and arguably placing the Mem-
ber States in potential violation of international human rights law.
Third, the legal framework of the EU appears to have created a means
and incentive for Member States to skirt their obligations under interna-
tional human rights law. Due in part to the weak enforcement mechanisms
of international human rights instruments, any such violation would go
without repercussions. On the other hand, a failure by a Member State to
comply with EU law or a judgment of the ECJ would place it in violation
of EU law with very real consequences. Grant v. South West Trains illus-
trates just such a situation where an EU Member State (here the UK)
chose to follow the ECJ interpretation of discrimination on the basis of
sex, rather than comply with the Advisory Opinion of the Human Rights
Committee. To the extent that EU law or ECJ judgments may be contrary
to international human rights law, the EU legal framework (as affirmed by
the Member States and the ECtHR) creates a strong incentive and “pull-
factor” for Member States to comply with EU law at the expense of their
international human rights obligations.
While the EU cannot be said at present to be in gross contravention of
international human rights, the current legal framework in place indicates
a systemic weakness and failure to adequately integrate the international
human rights instruments and no internal (or external) mechanisms to oth-
erwise ensure compliance.195 While a number of legal arguments have
been raised to try to bind the EU directly or indirectly to the international
human rights instruments, such as the notion of functional succession, it is
clear that the key judicial systems at play (the ECJ, ECtHR, and the Mem-
195. As of the writing of this article, a comprehensive right-by-right analysis tracking
trends in divergence has yet to be conducted.
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ber States) have not taken these into account, and a further solution is
needed.
On April 5, 2013, the negotiators of the Council of Europe and the
European Union took a critical step toward the accession of the EU to the
European Convention on Human Rights and finalized a draft accession
agreement.196 Although it is expected that the final terms of accession will
define a special relationship between the EU and ECtHR, which largely
replicates the Bosphorus standard, the impending accession also indicates
the EU’s willingness to ratify and become a party to international human
rights instruments. In light of this Note’s analysis, ratification of interna-
tional human rights instruments may be the surest way to mitigate the
challenge the EU currently poses to the international human rights regime
and ensure full and adequate protection of human rights in Europe.
196. The draft accession agreement is currently under review by the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU). See Press Release, Council of Europe, Milestone Reached in
Negotiations on Accession of EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, No.
DC041 (Apr. 5, 2013), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=DC-PR041%282013
%29&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntra
net=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE.
